October 23 - 25, 2024 at 9 AM - 10:30 AM AMT

In-Person at Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute Foundation, 8/8 Tsitsernakaberd highway, 0028, Yerevan, Armenia

Despite the proliferation of scholarship and academic research that has unequivocally proven its occurrence, the traumatic memory of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 has been met with state-sponsored denial in Turkey—the successor state of the Ottoman Empire which committed the crime. Armenians in the diaspora (the vast majority of whom descend from families that
survived the genocide) have fought against denialist narrative and policies perpetuated by Turkish authorities on this subject for decades. Further opposition to this denial can be found within the Republic of Armenia, where many citizens hail from survivors, and where denial by Turkey and allied Azerbaijan is perceived as one of many manifestations of hostility on the part of these two neighboring states. Furthermore, the Republic’s very structural framework has been shaped by recognition efforts: Article 11 of the Declaration of Independence stipulates that the Armenian state unequivocally supports efforts towards international recognition of the genocide.
While conversations surrounding the Armenian Genocide and the subsequent political and geopolitical developments which stemmed from it were omnipresent within Armenian circles from the interwar period onwards, this was not the case within the international community. The conceptualization of the crime of genocide itself, following the Jewish Holocaust during World War II, and the passage of the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in 1965—a milestone commemorated in Yerevan and diaspora-inhabited cities around the globe—enabled Armenians and their supporters to rescue the crime of 1915 from the international oblivion in which it had been trapped. As transnational activism surrounding the Armenian Genocide mobilized, the 1960s and 1970s were marked by an increasingly assertive and virulent politicization of the memory of the genocide; this activism took a variety of forms, from efforts to build monuments dedicated to the genocide (the most famous of which was the one in Yerevan, inaugurated in 1967 on Tsitsernakaberd Hill in Yerevan), to paramilitary violence by armed groups (ASALA, for Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, and JCAG, for Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide [later renamed ARA, for Armenian Revolutionary Army], active in the 1970s and 1980s).
In this context, in the absence of any hope of recognition by Turkey (let alone apologies or reparations), Armenian activists started to mobilize to obtain recognition of the Armenian Genocide from both resident state institutions and international government organizations alike. Their considerable and often years- or decades-long efforts eventually resulted in recognition
of the genocide among local and national institutions across the globe. Several of the earliest state governments to recognize the genocide included Uruguay (as early as 1965), Greece, Lebanon, Argentina, Russia, and France (in 2001); more recent recognizers include Germany, Syria, and the United States (through Congress in 2019 and the executive branch in 2021).
Conversely, other states and institutions have not yet officially solved the issue, remaining ambiguous, to say the least, on the matter: notable examples include Israel, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Furthermore, many African and Asian states and institutions (save for a few notable exceptions) have not been in a position to pronounce their views on the legitimacy of efforts to recognize the Armenian Genocide, rendering their stance on the matter difficult to decipher—if not unknown.
 

The central aim of this international conference is to study how and why, since the end of the  Second World War and more significantly since the 1960s onwards, international actors have positioned themselves on the matter of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide—as well as how and why their respective positions have evolved over time. A principal concrete goal will
be to analyze and compare the processes of recognizing (or refusing to recognize) the Armenian Genocide across a number of state governments, national and international stakeholders, and institutions at the local or provincial level, in order to understand when, why, and how some adopt clear positions in favor of recognition while others remain ambivalent. Diplomatic relations and geopolitical engagement with Turkey is often cited as a major determinant in navigating these processes; while this is an important factor at play, it should not mask or overshadow the recognition processes themselves, which are often deeply complex and balance the interests of a multiplicity of stakeholders on the issue. Therefore, this conference will not restrict itself to solely examining prominent state actors or international organizations: it will
engage with a multitude of state institutions and non-state actors (such as media organizations, NGOs, lobbies, private-sector actors, etc.) alike, including individuals and the ideologies which may motivate them, in order to better grasp these processes.
Whereas the Armenian Genocide is often—and rightfully—perceived and studied as a topic pertaining to the history of the early 20th century Ottoman Empire and of World War I, this international conference aims to provide a better understanding of the Armenian Genocide as a significant contemporary political, geopolitical, and memorial subject of study at different
local, national, international, and transnational levels. By specifically focusing on who supports and who opposes the recognition of the genocide and how these positions are fashioned and/or implemented, this conference will also provide an original perspective on the institutions, politics, and societies of the states or organizations that will be discussed, investigating the complex dynamics of memory at play. Comparative studies which link the Armenian case with other genocides or episodes of mass atrocity’s political memory will be welcomed, as well as reflections on how the political activism to formally recognize and memorialize one genocide may impact others. Despite being centered on the Armenian Genocide, this conference will also be an opportunity to consider the crime of genocide and its recognition (alongside national, international, and transnational political issues) through a broad, kaleidoscopic lens.

CO-SPONSORS:

Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute Foundation

The Laboratoire MIMMOC (Mémoires, Identités, Marginalités dans le Monde Occidental Contemporain) of the University of Poitiers, France

NAASR